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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CaseNo.20060525-SC 
BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZIE, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Brandon Yazzie was "already serving" a sentence in Judge Fuchs' case when 
Judge McCleve sentenced him. Probation is explicitly defined as a sentence in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 2007), which is located in the same chapter as the 
consecutive sentencing statute. That specific provision prevails over any more general 
language found in elsewhere in the Code, and establishes that a sentence a defendant is 
"already serving" under section 76-3-401(1) (2003) includes a sentence of probation. In 
addition, when the Legislature intends to specify that it is referring to a sentence that 
involves incarceration rather than all possible sentences, it ordinarily uses qualifying 
language. Because the Legislature referred to all sentences and did not limit the 
consecutive sentencing statute to sentences of incarceration, sentences "the defendant is 
already serving" under section 76-3-40 l(l)(b) includes sentences of probation. 
Moreover, even if the language were limited to sentences of incarceration, Judge Fuchs 
imposed jail time; therefore Yazzie was already serving a sentence regardless of whether 
the consecutive sentencing statute is limited to sentences of incarceration. 
Yazzie's sentence in Judge Fuchs' case did not cease to be a sentence when a 
probation violation report was filed. The tolling provision of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(11) (Supp. 2007) simply indicates that time that passes while a probation violation is 
pending does not count toward total probation time if the defendant is found to have been 
in violation. Even though the time is tolled, the defendant continues to be under a 
sentence of probation pursuant to section 77-18-1. And, if the defendant is subsequently 
found not to have violated probation, the time is not tolled. If the state were correct, a 
judge imposing sentence in a subsequent case would have no way of knowing whether 
the defendant was under sentence while a probation violation was pending. 
Practical concerns also support the conclusion that the consecutive/concurrent 
sentencing decision must be made at sentencing and not following probation violation. 
This case illustrates those concerns since Judge McCleve did not have an updated 
presentence report PSR and did not consider all of the necessary factors in deciding to 
impose consecutive sentences following probation revocation. Although at sentencing 
Judge McCleve did have a current PSR and conducted a full hearing, following probation 
revocation she apparently imposed consecutive sentences based on her incorrect belief 
that there was a presumption of consecutive sentences and the fact of the probation 
violation. 
Utah's rules and statutes require that the consecutive sentencing decision be made 
at sentencing and not after probation revocation. The PSR recognized this and 
2 
recommended that Judge McCleve impose the prison sentences in her case consecutively 
with each other but concurrently with the sentence in Judge Fuchs' case. Judge McCleve 
considered the PSR and apparently followed its recommendation by ordering that the 
sentences in her case run consecutively with each other. By increasing this sentence 
following probation revocation to include an order that her case run consecutively with 
that of Judge Fuchs, Judge McCleve violated Utah's statute and the protection against 
double jeopardy. Moreover, at sentencing she imposed a legal sentence because the 
judgment implicitly ordered that her sentence run concurrently with Judge Fuchs' 
sentence and even if it did not, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 contemplates that a sentence 
is legally imposed even if the judge does not include the consecutive/concurrent 
sentencing order in the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH STATUTES AND RULES REQUIRE THAT THE 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT SENTENCING DECISION BE MADE 
AT SENTENCING AND NOT FOLLOWING PROBATION VIOLATION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 requires that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing 
decision be made at sentencing regardless of whether a defendant is "already serving" 
another sentence. Other statutes and rules support this requirement by helping to ensure 
that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision is based on all relevant factors 
following a full hearing, rather than primarily on the fact that the defendant failed at 
probation. At sentencing, a trial court can impose sentence concurrently/consecutively 
with any other sentence a defendant is serving, including a sentence of probation. 
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After Yazzie was adjudged guilty, Judge McCleve considered the 
consecutive/concurrent determination at sentencing. R. 45-47. Because Yazzie was 
"already serving" a sentence in Judge Fuchs' case, Judge McCleve had the authority to 
decide at that time whether the sentence in her case was to run consecutively with the 
sentence in Judge Fuch's case. Neither the fact that Yazzie was on probation nor the fact 
that a probation violation report had been filed in the other case changed this requirement 
since probation is a sentence being served by a defendant. In addition to the statutory 
requirement that the determination be made at sentencing, practical considerations work 
in favor of making the decision at sentencing. In this case where Judge McCleve did not 
impose consecutive sentences at sentencing, she was precluded from doing so following 
probation violation by Utah's statutes and double jeopardy concerns. 
A. Although Yazzie was on probation in the other case, he was "already 
serving" a sentence when Judge McCleve sentenced him. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) requires a trial court to make the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision after the defendant "has been adjudged guilty 
of more than one felony offense," to state the decision on the record, and "indicate [it] in 
the order of judgment and commitment." Id. The statute allows a trial court to order a 
sentence "to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is 
already serving." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1 )(b). Because probation is a sentence, it 
qualifies as a sentence "the defendant is already serving" for purposes of the consecutive 
sentencing statute. See id. 
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Probation is specifically defined as a sentence under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-
201(2). The state acknowledges in passing that this provision allows a trial court to 
sentence a defendant to probation, but fails to acloiowledge that the statute also explicitly 
states that probation is a sentence. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(2) states: 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
Id. (emphasis added). Pursuant to "well-settled principle[s] of statutory construction," 
this specific, explicit definition of probation as a sentence takes precedence over any 
more general statutory language that the state relies on to support its claim that probation 
is not a sentence. Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 
72,1J19, 167 P.3d 1080 ("We acloiowledge the well-settled principle of statutory 
construction that 'when two provisions address the same subject matter and one provision 
is general while the other is specific, the specific provision controls.5") (citations 
omitted). 
Although this specific definition of probation as a sentence is found not only in the 
same title as Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401, but also in the same chapter, the state relies on 
statutes found in Title 77 to support its argument that probation is not a sentence a 
defendant "is already serving" within the meaning of section 76-3-401. See Appellee Br. 
at 12-13. This argument disregards not only the rules of statutory construction that 
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require that the specific provision prevail, but also the organization of Utah's Code and 
the interrelation of statutes found within a specific chapter. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201 (2) ("[wjithin the limits prescribed by this chapter . . ."). Because probation is 
specifically included as a possible sentence in the same chapter and immediately 
preceding the consecutive sentencing statute, it necessarily follows that probation is a 
sentence the defendant "is already serving" under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1). 
Rather than focusing on the specific definition of probation as a sentence found in 
76-3-201(2), the state relies primarily on a statute in the chapter of Title 77 pertaining to 
"Pardons and Paroles." See Appellee Br. at 12-13. Although the state is correct that 
section 77-27-1(10) (2003) states "[probation is an act of grace by the court suspending 
imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions," 
that language is general in nature and pertinent to the role of the Board of Pardons. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1. Because the statute does not specifically define sentences 
that a defendant can serve, its general language does not trump the specific language in 
section 76-3-201 which clearly states that probation is a sentence under that chapter. See 
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care, 2007 UT 72, ^ 19 (specific provision controls). 
Moreover, the chapter of Title 77 discussing Pardons and Paroles later narrows the word 
"sentence" by qualifying that the Board of Pardons has authority only over sentences 
where the persons are "committed to serve [the sentence] at penal or correctional 
facilities." Utah Code Ann. §77-27-5(l)(a) (Supp. 2007). In other words, when the 
Legislature needed to specify the sentences over which the Board has authority, it 
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expressly included language demonstrating that the sentence was one of imprisonment. 
Id 
Including qualifying language when the statute refers to a sentence of 
imprisonment rather than all possible sentences is consistent with other statutes and rules. 
See e.g. Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2), (d)(2), (f)(2) (referring to "a sentence that does not 
include a term of incarceration in jail or prison"); Utah Code Ann. §77-20-10(1) (Supp. 
2007) (including qualifying language to distinguish sentences that contain "a term of 
imprisonment in jail or prison"); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(d) (including qualifying language to 
distinguish sentences where "a jail or prison sentence is imposed"); Utah Code Ann. §78-
35a-302(4)(a) (2002) (including qualifying language to refer to a "sentence of 
imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. §77-15-3(1) (2003) (including qualifying language to 
specify a "sentence of imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. §76-3-208(1) (2003) (referring 
to "[p]ersons sentenced to imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201.l(5)(d) (2003) 
(allowing court to "execute the original sentence of imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. 
§63-25a-410(l)(f) (2004) (exempting "any convicted offender serving a sentence of 
imprisonment" from reparations); Utah Code Ann. §23-20-4(6) (2007) (requiring 
"sentence of incarceration" under certain circumstances). Moreover, the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing statute contains another subsection that explicitly 
defines "imprisoned" as meaning that a person has been "sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility ...." Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401(12). Hence, in the context of 
section 76-3-401 and other statutes, the Legislature uses qualifying language when it 
refers to sentences involving imprisonment. Since the Legislature did not include 
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qualifying language indicating that the consecutive sentencing decision applied only to 
sentences of imprisonment the defendant was already serving, sentences a "defendant is 
already serving" under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1 )(b) are not limited to sentences 
where the defendant is incarcerated. 
Other provisions of the Utah Code and Rules further demonstrate that probation is 
a sentence. For example, Utah R. Crim. P. 27(a)(2) recognizes that probation is a 
sentence since it allows "[a] sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation" to be stayed. 
Id. Utah Code Ann. §20A-2-101.5(2)(a) (2007) recognizes probation as a sentence since 
it allows a convicted felon's right to vote to be restored when "the felon is sentenced to 
probation." Id,; see also e.g. Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-505 (2005) (referring to probation 
as a possible sentence); Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-507(3) (2005) (probation recognized as a 
sentence); Utah Code Ann. §77-36-5 (2003) (recognizing probation as a sentence). 
The judgment entered by Judge McCleve at sentencing further shows that a trial 
court can order prison sentences to run consecutively even though a defendant is placed 
on probation. The judgment states that for the third degree felony convictions in Judge 
McCleve's case, Yazzie was sentenced to serve "0 - 5 years prison on each count, 
consecutive to each other, suspended all but 365 days jail" and placed on probation. R. 
47. As section 76-3-401 and other statutes contemplate, Judge McCleve made the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision and ordered that the prison sentences in her 
case be served consecutively even though she suspended those sentences and placed 
Yazzie on probation. 
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As this Court acknowledged in Velasquez v. Pratt, 443 P.2d 1020 (Utah 1968), a 
person who is on probation, "is deemed to be actually serving the sentence imposed." Id 
at 1021 (citing Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554 (Utah 1959)). This is consistent with 
Utah's statutory scheme, as outlined above and in Yazzie's opening brief, which 
recognizes probation as a sentence. It is also consistent with Utah procedure, which 
requires that sentence, which can be a sentence of fine, probation or imprisonment, be 
imposed from two to forty-five days after verdict or plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
Contrary to the state's argument, probation is a sentence and under section 76-3-401(1), it 
can be a sentence "the defendant is already serving." IcL Accordingly, when Judge 
McCleve sentenced Yazzie, he was already serving a sentence on the prior theft case. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1), Judge McCleve was required to make the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision when she sentenced Yazzie. 
B. A Defendant is still serving a sentence even if he is charged with a probation 
violation. 
The state argues alternatively that even if a sentence of probation is a sentence, it 
ceases to be sentence when a probation violation report is filed because of the tolling 
provision of Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11). This argument fails because (1) it is not 
supported by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11) or any other statute; 
and (2) it is illogical and unworkable. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11) requires that "[t]he running of the probation period 
is tolled" when a probation violation report is filed or an order to show cause is issued 
and "[a]ny time served by a probationer outside of confinement" after a probation 
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violation is charged does not count toward the total probation time "unless the 
probationer is exonerated." Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(1 l)(a)(i), (b). But these 
provisions say only that a defendant cannot count the time toward the total probation 
time; they do not say that the defendant is not serving a sentence. In fact, were it not for 
the sentence of probation, the trial court would not have authority to find that a defendant 
violated probation. 
Rather than establishing that probation ceases to be a sentence when a probation 
violation report is filed, the tolling provisions clarify that a defendant under a sentence of 
probation cannot count the time towards the total probation. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-
1(1 l)(a))(i), (b). The tolling provision therefore requires a sentence of probation to be in 
place and that the sentence continue while the probation violation is pending; in fact, the 
probation violation procedure is part of a sentence of probation, and absent a sentence of 
probation, there would be no basis for such a probation violation proceeding. Contrary to 
the state's argument, nothing in section 77-18-1(11) suggests that probation ceases to be a 
sentence when a probation violation report is filed or serves to undercut the explicit 
provision of section 76-3-201(2) that probation is a sentence. 
Moreover, the state's argument that probation ceases to be a sentence when a 
probation violation report is filed contains obvious practical limitations. The state seems 
to assume that any time a probation violation report is filed, the defendant will be found 
in violation of probation and the sentence of probation will therefore cease to exist at the 
time the probation violation report is filed. See Appellee Br. at 13-14. But in cases 
where a defendant is found not to have been in violation, the defendant does receive 
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credit toward the probationary period for the time during which the probation violation 
was pending. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11). Under the state's argument, a defendant 
who was held on a probation violation charge and subsequently found not to have 
violated probation would be serving a sentence the entire time whereas a defendant who 
is found to have violated probation would cease to serve a sentence at the time the 
probation violation report is filed. A judge who was imposing sentence in another case 
while a probation violation was pending in an earlier case would have no way of 
knowing, under the state's argument, whether the person was "already serving" a 
sentence; this makes the state's argument unworkable. 
Because the language of section 77-18-1(11) and other statutes as well as practical 
considerations fail to support the state's novel claim that a sentence ceases to exist when 
a probation violation report is filed, that claim fails. 
C. Practical considerations further demonstrate that the state is incorrect that 
probation is not a sentence for consecutive/concurrent sentencing purposes. 
As the dissent in Anderson noted, "[t]he majority's definition of 'already serving' 
may often lead to illogical results." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, ^  24, 157 P.3d 
809 (Davis, J., dissenting). Practical considerations in addition to the problems outlined 
by the Anderson dissent and in Yazzie's opening brief further demonstrate that a sentence 
of probation qualifies as a sentence a defendant is "already serving" under section 76-3-
401(l)(b). In fact, the judge overseeing a probation violation rarely, if ever, has an 
updated PSR and does not conduct a full sentencing hearing, making it difficult to 
comply with due process and section 76-3-401(1) in assessing whether to impose 
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consecutive sentences. Additionally, allowing the decision to be made following 
probation revocation can result in consecutive sentences based on the fact of the 
probation violation rather than the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(2). In 
this case, where Judge McCleve did not impose her sentence consecutively with that of 
Judge Fuchs at sentencing when she had the benefit of a current PSR and full input from 
the parties, imposing a consecutive sentence more than a year later without benefit of an 
updated report or a full sentencing hearing demonstrates that practical considerations also 
favor making the determination at sentencing. 
The Anderson dissent further recognized that the majority's decision was illogical 
and impractical in part because a probationary sentence that included jail time would 
trigger the consecutive sentencing statute whereas a probationary sentence without jail 
time would not. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, *|24 (Davis, J., dissenting). In other words, 
under the Anderson majority's approach, a defendant who received jail as part of 
probation would be "already serving" a sentence whereas a defendant who received 
straight probation without jail would not be serving a sentence. See id. (Davis, J., 
dissenting). In this case where Yazzie was given credit for two years of jail and remained 
in jail after sentencing pending completion of the CATS program, Yazzie was "already 
serving" a sentence under the view of the Anderson majority regardless of whether 
probation is considered a sentence. See docket in Judge Fuchs case at 8 in Addendum. 
The majority's decision is also unworkable because it allows a judge to impose 
consecutive sentences based almost entirely on the fact of a probation violation rather 
than based on the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(2) after a full sentencing hearing. 
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While the second sentencing judge generally has a current PSR, holds a full sentencing 
hearing that complies with due process, and considers all relevant sentencing factors, a 
probation violation judge rarely has a current PSR or conducts a full sentencing hearing. 
This is so because the probation violation judge usually executes the previously imposed 
sentence without making a new sentencing decision. 
This case highlights the inability of a probation violation judge to fully consider 
all appropriate factors for determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. Judge 
McCleve did not have an updated PSR report; instead, the file contains a PSR prepared 
over a year earlier and there is no indication that McCleve reviewed that report prior to 
imposing consecutive sentences at the probation violation hearing. R. 48, 82. The 
hearing itself did not include a discussion of the factors relevant to the consecutive 
sentencing decision. R. 82. Instead, the prosecutor argued that the judge "[mjight as 
well run them consecutive. . . . The Board of Pardons is going to determine how many 
years he is going to stay there regardless. . . ." R. 82:3. Although defense counsel 
began to object, McCleve interrupted and imposed consecutive sentences because she 
believed, incorrectly, that consecutive sentences were presumed. She stated, "[t]he 
presumption is consecutive. So Fm going to go consecutive." R. 83:4. The record of the 
probation violation hearing therefore shows that the judge did not comply with due 
process, Rule 22(a), and section 76-3-401(2) by considering all relevant sentencing 
factors, and instead imposed consecutive sentences based on a probation violation and the 
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incorrect belief that the statute required her to presume that the sentences be served 
consecutively.1 
The unpublished decision in State v. Workman, 2007 UT App 199 (unpublished), 
further demonstrates the impracticality of allowing the probation violation judge to make 
the consecutive sentencing decision following revocation. Although the trial court made 
the consecutive sentencing decision following probation revocation, the court of appeals 
did not address the propriety of this procedure in Workman. Id. Workman therefore 
does not provide support for the state's position. Workman does, however, show the 
difficulties that occur in fairly determining the propriety of consecutive sentences when 
the probation revocation judge makes the decision. In fact, after imposing consecutive 
sentences, the probation violation judge in Workman retained jurisdiction '"to make a 
change as to the consecutive sentence if there is a recommendation5" from the other 
sentencing court. Id. The probation violation judge apparently recognized that the judge 
who would be sentencing Workman on the new case would be in a better position to 
assess the consecutive sentencing decision as part of a complete sentencing proceeding. 
Accordingly, the probation violation judge suggested that he might be willing to defer to 
the decision of the other court. Rather than suggesting that the state's position provides 
Judge McCleve was incorrect in presuming that the sentences were to run 
consecutively. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(3) creates such a presumption only if the 
defendant is imprisoned or on parole when he commits the new offense. Since Yazzie 
was not in prison nor on parole when he committed the crimes in Judge McCleve's case, 
the presumption of subsection (3) did not apply. Instead, Judge McCleve was required to 
make the decision based on the factors set forth in section 76-3-401(2) without presuming 
either possibility. 
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the better procedure, Workman highlights a problem in allowing the probation violation 
judge to make the consecutive sentencing decision. Id. 
The majority's decision in Anderson further impacts on the finality of judgments, 
the timing for filing an appeal, and Utah criminal procedure in general. Although a 
judgment is considered final when the judgment is entered, allowing a consecutive 
sentencing determination to be made following probation violation injects a lack of 
finality. While historically and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(12), trial courts 
have been limited to revoking probation and executing the original sentence, the 
majority's new rule allows courts to impose an additional and harsher sentence following 
probation revocation. And, a defendant is not informed of the actual sentence until after 
probation revocation, thereby undermining a defendant's ability to rely on the finality of 
a judgment entered at sentencing and interfering with the orderly appeal of a sentence a 
defendant believes is too harsh. The imposition of consecutive sentences following 
probation violation was contrary not only to the language of section 76-3-401(1) but also 
violated established procedure which consistently recognizes that final judgment is 
entered shortly after a criminal defendant is adjudged guilty. 
D. Utah law authorizes the trial court to make the consecutive/concurrent 
sentencing decision at sentencing and not after probation violation. 
As previously outlined, Utah's statutes and rules contemplate that a criminal 
sentence, including the consecutive sentencing decision, be stated on the record and 
entered in the judgment and commitment, ordinarily between two and forty-five days 
after plea or verdict. See e,g. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1). Utah's statutes and rules 
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work together to ensure that trial courts have the tools necessary to make an informed 
sentencing decision at that time, and also to ensure that a final judgment allowing a 
timely appeal is in place shortly after verdict or plea, regardless of whether the defendant 
is placed on probation. As has been shown, requiring that the consecutive/concurrent 
sentencing decision be made at sentencing and entered in the judgment is consistent with 
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401, other statutes, and practical 
considerations; it is also consistent with the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and is 
not undermined by the clarification provision of Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 further demonstrates that section 76-3-401(1) requires that the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and not following 
probation violation. Rule 22(a) uses language similar to that in section 76-3-401(1) when 
it requires that sentencing occur shortly after a person is adjudged guilty. Rule 22(a) is 
also consistent with Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1) in requiring that the prosecutor and 
defendant be allowed to present evidence relevant to sentencing - and the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision - at the sentencing hearing held shortly after 
a person is adjudged guilty. Rule 22(c) is likewise consistent with section 76-3-401(1) in 
indicating that sentence is imposed and judgment and commitment is entered shortly after 
a person is adjudged guilty, and not following probation violation. Because section 76-3-
401(1) requires that the consecutive sentencing decision be made at sentencing and 
indicated in the order of judgment and commitment, and Rule 22 works hand in hand 
with this statute to outline the procedure for a fair sentencing, Rule 22 further 
demonstrates that the consecutive sentencing decision must be made at sentencing. 
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The provision in section 76-3-401 that allows the Board of Pardons to "request 
clarification from the [trial] court" if the judgment does not contain a 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing order does not change the requirement that the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision be made at sentencing and not following 
probation violation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). Although section 76-3-401(4) does 
allow the Board to ask for clarification if the judgment and commitment does not contain 
a consecutive/concurrent sentencing order, it does not authorize the trial court to actually 
make the decision for the first time after judgment has been entered and jurisdiction has 
been transferred to the Board of Pardons. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(4) states: 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall 
enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
Id. While this section was meant to clarify that the Board need not presume that 
sentences are to run concurrently if the judgment does not explicitly state otherwise (see 
former Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401), it simply affects the procedure that can be utilized by 
the Board for clarification if the judgment is not clear and does not create jurisdiction for 
further proceedings in the trial court. 
Additionally, if the trial court were to consider the question of consecutive 
sentences for the first time upon receipt of a letter from the Board, the court would be 
required to hold a hearing and consider all of the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. §76-
3-401(2) in order to comply with statutory, rule and due process requirements. Nothing 
in this section or elsewhere in the Code grants the trial court jurisdiction to consider 
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sentencing matters in a criminal case after judgment has been entered, the defendant has 
been committed to prison, and jurisdiction has been transferred to the Board of Pardons. 
When section 76-3-401 is read as a whole, it is evident that subsection (4) is meant to do 
nothing more than do away with the presumption of concurrent sentences and instead 
allow the Board to receive clarification regarding a previously imposed sentence. 
Moreover, subsection (4) was not implicated in this case because the Board did not 
request clarification of the sentence and the judgment Judge McCleve entered did not 
require clarification. Judge McCleve's imposition of consecutive sentences only for the 
two felony counts in her case, but not with the sentence in Judge Fuchs' case, shows that 
Judge McCleve made the consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision at sentencing and 
did not require that Judge Fuchs' sentence be served consecutively. In fact, the PSR 
referred to Judge Fuchs' case and recommended that Judge McCleve run the prison 
sentences in her case consecutively with each other but concurrently with the sentence in 
Judge Fuchs' case. R. 48: 2, 6. That is what Judge McCleve did at sentencing; by 
deciding the issue at sentencing and issuing an order that did not require that her sentence 
run consecutively with Judge Fuchs' sentence, Judge McCleve followed the PSR 
recommendation and entered a judgment that was sufficiently clear so as to require that 
her sentences run concurrently with those in Judge Fuchs' case. 
The clarity of Judge McCleve's judgment on the consecutive sentencing issue is 
buttressed not only by the PSR recommendation, but also by a review of section 
76-3-401(1). The directive of subsection (1) that a[a] court shall determine, if a 
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose 
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concurrent or consecutive sentences . . . [and] state on the record and [ ] indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment" applies to both scenarios for consecutive sentencing 
decisions that were before Judge McCleve. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. The statute 
contains no language requiring that the decision for sentences in the same case must be 
made at sentencing while the decision regarding other cases may be made later. In fact, 
allowing a trial court to bifurcate the decision as was ultimately done in this case unduly 
complicates sentencing, leads to decisions imposing consecutive sentences without 
considering all relevant factors, and deprives a defendant of expectation of finality in a 
sentence. Judge McCleve had already made the consecutive/concurrent sentencing 
decision and followed the PSR recommendation by not imposing her sentence 
consecutively to that of Judge Fuchs. She did not have the authority to later reconsider 
the decision and impose consecutive sentences. 
E. Because section 76-3-401(1) requires that the consecutive sentencing decision 
be made at sentencing and the trial court made that determination without 
imposing consecutive sentences, later imposition of consecutive sentences violates 
the protection against double jeopardy 
Although double jeopardy is not implicated under Utah's statutory scheme when a 
trial court revokes probation and executes a previously imposed sentence, it is violated 
when a trial court imposes a harsher sentence following probation revocation. In other 
words, requiring Yazzie to serve his previously imposed sentence of incarceration did not 
violate double jeopardy, but imposing a harsher sentence by requiring him to serve his 
sentences consecutively did violate that protection since a less severe sentence had 
previously been imposed. Under a statutory system such as Utah's which authorizes a 
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court to impose sentence before probation, but authorizes only the execution of that 
sentence following probation revocation, a double jeopardy violation occurs when a trial 
judge increases a sentence to include a consecutive requirement after revoking probation. 
As previously outlined, Utah's statutory scheme requires sentencing shortly after a 
person is adjudged guilty, and requires that the consecutive/concurrent sentencing 
decision be made at that time. See inter alia Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(a). Once sentence is imposed, Utah's statutory scheme authorizes only the 
execution of sentence and does not authorize the imposition of a harsher sentence. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12). Under a different statutory scheme that authorized the 
imposition of a harsher sentence following probation violation, the double jeopardy 
concerns might not surface. But in Utah, where final sentence is entered shortly after the 
defendant is adjudged guilty and before probation and the statute contemplates that a 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision will be included in that final sentence, 
imposing a consecutive sentence for the first time following probation violation results in 
a harsher sentence in violation of double jeopardy. 
As outlined in Appellant's brief at 24-26, double jeopardy is violated when a 
sentence is increased after a defendant begins to serve it. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 
173 (1873). A sentence is harsher or increased if additional terms or conditions are 
imposed. See State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981). States like Utah that 
limit a trial court to executing a previously imposed sentence following probation 
violation, have concluded that the "subsequent imposition of new conditions or terms to a 
sentence" after probation violation violates the double jeopardy protection. Tran v. State, 
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965 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. 
Tomlin, 336 A.2d 407, 408-09 (Pa. Super. 1975); Nelson v. State, 617 P.2d 502, 504 
(Alaska 1981). 
A consecutive sentencing order following probation violation is a new term that 
increases the sentence. The fact that the Board of Pardons will decide actual release date 
does not detract from the fact that a trial court's order of consecutive sentences 
constitutes a harsher sentence than a concurrent sentencing order. Indeed, trial courts 
would not be required to make a decision between consecutive and concurrent sentences 
if a consecutive sentence did not result in a harsher sentence. And, the Utah Sentence 
and Release Guidelines, Appx. D in Utah Ct. R. Ann. at 1610 (2007), recommend that an 
inmate serve significantly more time when a trial court order that the sentence be served 
consecutively with other sentences. 
As the court explained in Tomlin, increasing a sentence following probation 
violation violates double jeopardy because the judge had previously imposed a lighter 
sentence for the crime. Tomlin, 336 A.2d at 409. The court explained further that 
allowing imposition of an increased sentence following probation violation was not 
reasonable nor fair since the court had previously fully considered the applicable 
evidence and "on that basis has assessed a proper sentence.5' Id. It rejected the 
imposition of a harsher sentence following probation revocation, stating in part, "[t]he 
infirmity of increasing a previously imposed sentence is that the trial judge has evaluated 
the evidence and on that basis has assessed a proper sentence. Because the trial court 
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pronounced sentence upon the appellant, the court was bounds by the terms of the 
original sentence.55 Id. 
The court in Tran reached a similar conclusion, reasoning that sentence had 
previously been imposed under Florida's statutory scheme. Tran, 965 So.2d at 229. It 
pointed out that "'[ojnce a sentence has been imposed and the person begins to serve the 
sentence, that sentence may not be increased without running afoul of double jeopardy 
principles.55 Ld. (citation omitted). Because the defendant had begun serving his sentence 
when the judge decided to impose treatment for a duration of five years, the court held 
that the treatment condition part of the sentence violated double jeopardy. Id. 
The cases cited by the state at 28-32 do not provide guidance since for the most 
part they do not involve statutory schemes that require that the consecutive sentencing 
decision be made at sentencing nor circumstances where the judge has already decided 
the consecutive/concurrent sentencing issue. See, e.g., United States v. Olivares-
Martines, 767 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (indicating that double jeopardy was not 
violated because "Congress has provided a court with the power to modify a sentence in 
light of changed circumstances.55); State v. Holcomb, 360 S.E.2d 232, 234, 238-39 
(W.Va. 1987) (indicating that double jeopardy was not violated where the trial court had 
suspended the imposition of sentence); State v. Ryerson, 570 A.2d 709, 711 (Conn. Ct. 
App. 1990) (stating "the probation revocation sentencing court. . . has the statutory 
authority to impose [consecutive sentences]55); People v. Preuss, 920 P.2d 859, 861 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1995) (stating that following probation violation, the "trial court was authorized 
to impose any sentence . . . that originally could have been imposed . . .55). Because the 
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statutory authority allowed a trial court to make the consecutive sentencing decision 
following probation violation, the courts concluded that imposition of consecutive 
sentences following probation revocation did not violate double jeopardy. By contrast, 
because Utah's statutory scheme requires that the consecutive sentencing decision be 
made at sentencing, increasing the sentence following probation revocation to require that 
it be served consecutively violates the protections against double jeopardy. 
In the present case, Yazzie began serving his sentence when Judge McCleve 
sentenced him on April 25, 2005. R. 46-47. In fact, he was required to serve 365 days in 
jail, with the two consecutive prison terms suspended. R. 47. Judge McCleve considered 
the consecutive/concurrent sentencing issue and followed the recommendations of the 
PSR (R. 48:2, 6); she expressly required that the two prison sentences in her case be 
served consecutively even though she placed Yazzie on probation, but did not require that 
the sentence in her case be served consecutively with the sentence in Judge Fuchs' case. 
R. 47. Because Judge McCleve did not sentence Yazzie to consecutive sentences at the 
time she was statutorily authorized to do so, she was precluded from later increasing the 
sentence to include a consecutive sentencing order. The order imposing consecutive 
sentences following probation revocation increased Yazzie's sentence in violation of the 
protection against double jeopardy. 
F. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) does not allow a trial court to impose a consecutive 
sentencing order for the first time following probation revocation. 
The state's claim that Judge McCleve's sentence was illegal fails because, as 
previously outlined, Judge McCleve considered the issue at sentencing and implicitly 
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ordered that her case be served concurrently with that of Judge Fuchs, and also because 
the failure to explicitly state the consecutive/concurrent decision in the judgment does not 
result in an illegal sentence. 
Although section 76-3-401 requires the trial court to make the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing decision at sentencing and include that decision in the 
judgment, it also recognizes that a trial court might on occasion fail to include that 
determination in the judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) & (4). By expressly 
indicating that the Board of Pardons can ask for clarification if a judgment does not 
contain a concurrent/consecutive sentencing determination, the Legislature also implicitly 
indicated that the failure to include the designation does not result in an illegal sentence. 
Indeed, if the state were correct that a judgment without a concurrent/consecutive 
designation is illegal, a significant number of inmates who are currently serving 
sentences that do not contain such a designation would be serving illegal sentences. 
Moreover, as previously outlined, in this case Judge McCleve actually reached the 
consecutive/concurrent sentencing determination at sentencing. She imposed the 
sentences in her own case consecutively but followed the PSR and did not issue such an 
order regarding the sentence in Judge Fuch's case. Under these facts, it is implicit in 
Judge McCleve's original judgment that she was not imposing her sentence consecutively 
with that in Judge Fuchs5 case. 
2
 Yazzie claimed in his opening brief that even if the issue was not preserved, Judge 
McCleve's imposition of consecutive sentences following probation violation was an 
illegal sentence and could be reviewed pursuant to Utah R. Grim. P. 22(e). Yazzie did 
not claim that the initial sentencing imposed by Judge McCleve was illegal. 
24 
The state's argument that Judge McCleve's sentence was illegal is not supported 
by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 or the facts of the case. Additionally, it is not a practical 
argument since the logical consequence of the argument would be that many inmates are 
serving illegal sentences. Because the sentence Judge McCleve imposed at sentencing 
was not illegal, the state's Rule 22(e) argument fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Brandon Yazzie respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the consecutive sentencing order. 
SUBMITTED this J_y_ day of February, 2008. 
JOAN C. WATT 
PATRICK CORUM 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI 
CASE NUMBER 021910707 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-404 - FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE 1st Degree Felony 
(amended) to 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea. January 27, 2 00 3 Guilty 
Disposition January 27, 2003 Guilty 
Charge 2 - 76-5-4 04 - FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: January 27, 2003 Guilty 
Disposition: January 27, 2003 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
RANDALL SKANCHY 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant - BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI 
Represented by: KAREN J STAM 
Also Known As - BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZIE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI 
Offense tracking number: 13643184 
Date of Birth: June 29, 1984 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 02-156295 
Prosecuting Agency. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number 02016011 
Sheriff Office Number: 265436 
Violation Date: August 25, 2002 WEST TEMPLE & MARKET STREET 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
CASE NOTE 
dao 02016011 
PROCEEDINGS 
Printed: 02/12/08 11:43 40 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 021910707 State Felony 
08-2 9-02 Judge DENNIS M FUCHS assigned. 
08-29-02 Note: CASE FILED BY DET CATHY SCHONEY OF SLC DEF IS IN JAIL 
WARRANT FAX TO THE JAIL 
08-29-02 Case filed 
08-29-02 Filed: Information 
08-30-02 Note: Bail remain $100,007 
08-3 0-02 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on September 03, 20 02 at 09:30 AM 
in Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
09-03-02 Note: FILED: Affidavit of Indigency - Judge Bohlmg signed and 
appointed LDA to represent defendant m this case. 
09-03-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel 
Judge- WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
PRESENT 
Clerk: melbar 
Prosecutor: CHRISTENSEN, VIRGINIA 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: 10-23-04 
ARRAIGNMENT 
The Information is read. 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Legal Defender 
Office to represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: Legal Defender Office 
City: 
Phone: 
Instructions to the defendant: 
1. You are to immediately contact and consult with appointed 
counsel. 
2. You are to cooperate with the appointed counsel m the defense 
of this case. 
3. You are to keep appointed counsel advised at all times of an 
address and a telephone number where you can be reached. 
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4 Attorney's fees for services of counsel may be assessed at the 
time of sentence 
ROLL CALL is scheduled 
Date 09/10/2002 
Time 02 00 p m 
Location To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge SANDRA PEULER 
09-04-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on September 10, 2002 at 02 00 PM m To Be 
Determined with Judge PEULER 
09-05-02 Note Bail remain $100,007 
09-06-02 Filed Appearance of counsel 
09-06-02 Filed Formal request for discovery pursuant to rule 16 of the 
rules of criminal procedure 
09-10-02 Filed AMENDED INFORMATION 
09-10-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge SANDRA PEULER 
PRESENT 
Clerk kathyg 
Prosecutor MICKLOS, ANGELA F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) STAM, KAREN S 
Video 
Tape Number 1 Tape Count 3 02 
HEARING 
Roll call continued to October 1, 2 0 02 at 2 pm with Judge Noel 
ROLL CALL 
Date 10/01/2002 
Time 02 00 p m 
Location To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge FRANK G NOEL 
09-11-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on October 01, 2002 at 02 00 PM m To Be 
Determined with Judge NOEL 
09-12-02 Charge 76-5-402 Sev Fl was amended to 76-5-404 Sev F2 
10-01-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge FRANK G NOEL 
PRESENT 
Clerk micheldb 
Prosecutor MURPHY, J KEVIN 
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Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S. 
Video 
Tape Number: 10/1/02 Tape Count: off record 
HEARING 
ATD requests a continuance of the roll call. 
ROLL CALL. 
Date: 10/29/2002 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
10-02-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on October 29, 2002 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge FRATTO. 
10-29-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge: JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: DANE NOLAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAREN S. STAM 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 3.52 
HEARING 
Roll call continued to 11/12. 
ROLL CALL. 
Date: 11/12/2002 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
11-01-02 ROLL CALL scheduled on November 12, 2 0 02 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge SKANCHY. 
11-12-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chandeei 
Prosecutor: MICKLOS, ANGELA F 
Defendant 
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CASE NUMBER 021910707 State Felony 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S. 
Video 
Tape Count: OFF 
HEARING 
Court Orders case set for a Preliminary Hearing 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 12/10/2002 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Before Judge: REESE, ROBIN W. 
11-12-02 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on December 10, 2002 at 09:00 AM 
in Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
12-10-02 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on December 24, 2002 at 09:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - S41 with Judge MCCLEVE. 
12-10-02 Note: ANGELA MICKLOS CALLED TO RESET PRELIM ON 12/24/02 2PM TO 
12/24/02 9AM. KAREN STAM STIPULATED. CLERK ORDERED COURT 
REPORTER. 
12-10-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: bethkl 
Prosecutor: MICKLOS, ANGELA F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S. 
Video 
Tape Number: 12/10/02 Tape Count: 11.22 
HEARING 
UPON DEFENSE MOTION C/O CASE CONT, MOTION TO RELEASE DENIED DEFT 
TO CONTACT PTS 
12-20-02 Filed: Notice of Expert Witness 
12-24-02 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on January 14, 2003 at 09:00 AM 
in Third Floor - W3 8 with Judge MAUGHAN. 
12-24-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: SHEILA K. MCCLEVE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lauraj 
Reporter: YOUNG, BRAD 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): COLLINS FOR MICKLOS 
CAT/CIC 
Tape Number: 12/24/02 Tape Count: 9:22:30 
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CASE NUMBER 021910707 State Felony 
HEARING 
COUNSELS STIPULATED TO CONTINUE PRELIM TO 1/14/2003 AT 9AM BEFORE 
JUDGE MAUGHAN 
01 14-03 Note Case Bound Over 
01-14-03 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on January 27, 2003 at 08 30 AM m Fourth 
Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS 
01 14-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge PAUL G MAUGHAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk cheril 
Reporter GREEN, TEENA 
Prosecutor MICKLOS, ANGELA F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) STAM, KAREN S 
Video 
Tape Number Video Tape Count 10 4 0 
Defense counsel appeared advising the court that the deft will 
waive his right to a preliminary hearing at this time, based on the 
state going to speak with the Park Commitee regarding amending the 
charge All conditions of the waiver read into record 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto 
This case is bound over An Arraignment hearing has been set on 
1/27/03 at 8 30 AM m courtroom W45 before Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
01-14-03 Note INCOURT NOTE minutes modified 
01-27-03 Charge 1 amended 
01-27-03 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
01-27-03 Minute Entry -
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk wendypg 
Prosecutor STOTT, ROBERT L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) STAM, KAREN S 
Video 
Tape Number VIDEO Tape Count 10 13 
ARRAIGNMENT 
The Infoimation is read 
Defendant is arraigned 
Presentence Investigation ordered 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare the repoit 
Defendant transported - entered a plea and signed affidavit State 
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enters a 2nd amended information - sworn. Court orders AP&P to 
conduct a pshycho-sexual evaluation on defendant. Court sets 
this over for sentencing on the following date: 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/24/2003 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
01-27-03 SENTENCING scheduled on March 24, 2003 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
01-27-03 Filed order: Second Amended Information 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed January 27, 2003 
01-27-03 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed January 27, 2003 
03-14-03 Filed: Memo AP&P - Defendant was evaluated. 
03-21-03 Note: Received Presentence Investigation Report 
03-24-03 Tracking started for Probation. Review date Mar 24, 2006. 
03-24-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chandeei 
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S. 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:50 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
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Court Orders prison commitments to run consecutive with each other 
Credit is granted for 2 year(s) previously served 
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE 
Upon successful completion of the CATS program, the Court may 
consider an early release 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 2 
Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $9250 00 
Surcharge: $344.59 
Due: $750.00 
Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $9250 00 
Surcharge: $344 5 9 
Due: $750 00 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$20000.00 
$18500.00 
$689.18 
$1500.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Fine to be paid through AP&P 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay m behalf of: LDA 
The amount of Attorney Fees 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s) 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1500 00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
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Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer 
Participate m and complete any educational, and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole 
Violate no laws 
Enter, participate m , and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Participate m mental health counseling. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Court ordered no contact with victim. 
The defendant to enter into and complete the Cognitive 
Restructuring classes approved by the Court or Probation Officer. 
Report regularly 
Successfully complete the CATS program and aftercare 
Complete a Sex Offender program 
03-24-03 Note: Faxed copy of minutes from 3/24/03 to jail 
03-27-03 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: LDA 
Debtor: BRANDON DOMINIC YAZZI 
250.00 Attorneys Fees 
250.00 Judgment Grand Total 
03-27-03 Filed judgment: Criminal Sentence @J 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed March 24, 2003 
02-24-04 Filed order: Order to Enter and Complete CATS Program in Jail 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed February 24, 2 0 04 
02-24-04 Note: ORDER FAXED TO THE JAIL 
08-18-04 Filed: Defendant sent and Letter and Order for a Review. 
08-19-04 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on August 30, 2004 at 08:30 AM m 
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
08-19-04 Note: RE: letter from defendant - court sets this over for a 
Review. DMF/wpg 
08-3 0-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E 
Defendant not present 
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Video 
Tape Number. CD#2 
HEARING 
Defendant not brought into court. Counsel - Karen Stam - not 
present. Court continues to the following date: 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 09/13/2004 
Time: 08-30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
08-3 0-04 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on September 13, 2 0 04 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS. 
08-30-04 Note Counsel Notified. 
09-13-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk- wendypg 
Prosecutor: PARKER, PAUL 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN S. 
Video 
Tape Number: CD#2 Tape Count: 9-33-40 
HEARING 
Defendant transported for a review. Has not been able to get into 
CATS. Counsel requests defendant be allowed to enter an inpatient 
treatment program - Serenity, once a bed becomes available. 
Court will grant once funding is in place and an order prepared by 
counsel. All probation conditions to remain. 
11-09-04 Filed order: Order of Release and Transportation to Serenity 
House 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed November 09, 2 0 04 
11-09-04 Note: ORDER FAXED TO JAIL 
02-01-05 Filed: AP&P progress/violation report - Location of defendant 
unknown. Request a bench warrant. 
02-01-05 Filed: Affidavit m Support of Order to Show Cause 
02-03-05 Filed order: AP&P p/v report - Court orders a $50,000 bench 
warrant. 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed February 03, 2005 
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02-03-05 Filed order. Order to Show Cause 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed February 03, 2005 
02-03-05 Tracking ended for Probation. 
02-03-05 Notice - WARRANT for Case 021910707 ID 6186914 
02-03-05 Warrant ordered on: February 03, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141918 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 50000.00 
02-03-05 Warrant issued on: February 03, 2005 Warrant Num: 981141918 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 50000.00 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
Issue reason: Failure to Comply with Probation 
02-14-05 Warrant recalled on: February 14, 2005 Warrant num: 981141918 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
02-14-05 Note: Case referred to Judge Fuchs - Deft booked. 
02-14-05 BENCH WARRANT HRG scheduled on February 16, 2005 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
02-16-05 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on March 14, 2005 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
02-16-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Warrant Hrg 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: autumnc 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: CD#12 Tape Count: 8-47 
HEARING 
Defendant transported for a Bench Warrant Hearing. Court sets 
this over for an Order to Show Cause for he following date: 
Counsel Notified: (K. Stam) 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled. 
Date: 03/14/2005 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
03-08-05 Filed: AP&P progress/violation report - Defendant in violation 
of probation. Request an OSC. 
03-08-05 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause 
03-09-05 Filed order: Order to Show Cause 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed March 09, 2005 
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03-14-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
Video 
Tape Number: CD#12 Tape Count: 9-3 0 
HEARING 
Defendant transported for an Order to Show Cause. Admits 
allegation. Defendant has a sentencing date on another case 
pending. Court contines for a Disposition on the following date: 
DISPOSITION is scheduled. 
Date: 04/04/2005 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
03-14-05 DISPOSITION scheduled on April 04, 2005 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS. 
03-15-05 Notice - WARRANT for Case 021910707 ID 6224096 
03-15-05 Warrant ordered on: March 15, 2005 Warrant Num: 981144224 No 
Bail 
03-15-05 Warrant issued on: March 15, 2005 Warrant Num: 981144224 No 
Bail 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
Issue reason: Defendant to be held without bail pending 
sentencing. 
03-30-05 Warrant recalled on: March 30, 2005 Warrant num: 981144224 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled defendant booked 
03-30-05 Note: Defendant booked on NO BAIL warrant. Referred to Judge 
Fuchs. 
04-04-05 DISPOSITION scheduled on April 25, 2005 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W4 5 with Judge FUCHS. 
04-04-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for DISPOSITION 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, JOHN K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J 
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Video 
Tape Number: CD#14 Tape Count: 9-26 
HEARING 
Defendant transported for a Disposition. Counsel moves to 
continue - waiting to resolve case before Judge Atherton. 
DISPOSITION. 
Date: 04/25/2005 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W45 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
04-25-05 Minute Entry - Post Sentencing 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: UPDEGROVE, KENNETH R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
Video 
Tape Number: CD#15 Tape Count: 10-12 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated 
in the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 1 
The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant's probation is reinstated for 36 months beginning 
April 25, 2005. 
Defendant transported for an OSC. Court orders defendant serve 3 65 
days jail. No Credit Time Served. Upon release, all conditions of 
probation to remain. 
Court will consider an early release should defendant complete 
CATS. 
04-25-05 Tracking started for Probation. Review date Apr 25, 2 008. 
02-15-06 Filed: AP&P Progress/Violation Report - Defendant non 
compliant, request a $50,000 no-bail warrant be issued and an 
OSC be set. 
02-15-06 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause 
02-16-06 Filed order: AP&P p/v report - Court orders a bench warrant . 
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Signed February 10, 2006 
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02-16-06 Filed order: Order Show Cause 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed February 10, 2006 
02-16-06 Tracking ended for Probation. 
02-16-06 Notice - WARRANT for Case 021910707 ID 6537145 
02-16-06 Warrant ordered on: February 16, 2006 Warrant Num: 981164865 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 50000.00 
02-16-06 Warrant issued on: February 16, 2006 Warrant Num: 981164865 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 50000.00 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
Issue reason: Failure to Comply with Probation 
04-05-06 Warrant recalled on: April 05, 2006 Warrant num: 981164865 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
04-05-06 Note: Case referred to Judge Fuchs - Deft booked in ADC. 
04-05-06 BENCH WARRANT HRG scheduled on April 12, 2006 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
04-06-06 Filed: AP&P Progress/Violation Report - Updated Information as 
of April 5, 2006 - request OSC be held. 
04-07-06 Filed order: AP&P p/v report - Court grants OSC. 
Judge DENNIS M FUCHS 
Signed April 06, 2006 
04-12-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Warrant Hrg 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: CD 3 5 Tape Count: 9-10-36 
HEARING 
Defendant transported for a bench warrant hearing. Court sets 
this over for an Order to Show Cause on the following date: 
(counsel, K. Stam, notified) 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled. 
Date: 04/24/2006 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W4 5 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
04-12-06 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on April 24, 2006 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W45 with Judge FUCHS. 
04-24-06 Minute Entry - Post Sentencing 
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Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: SHUMAN, JON D 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STAM, KAREN J 
Video 
Tape Number: CD 3 8 Tape Count: 9-09-41 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated 
in the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 6,13,14 
The following numbered allegations are dismissed as stated in the 
affidavit and Order to Show Cause: remaining 
The defendant's probation is terminated unsuccessfully. 
Defendant transported for an OSC. Court imposes original sentence 
of 1-15 at USP. Both counts to run Consecutive with Credit for 
Time Served. All fines/fees to be referred to the Board of 
Pardons. 
04-24-06 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is DENNIS M FUCHS 
01-01-07 Judge RANDALL SKANCHY assigned. 
Printed: 02/12/08 11:43:52 Page 15 (last) 
